Data di Pubblicazione:
2016
Abstract:
In contracts, change and stability are usually regarded as conflicting patterns, with the result that systems tend to favour one aspect to the detriment of the other. The classical and neo-classical contract model - both in civil law and common law systems - have always leant towards stability, by attributing a central role to the promise, defined as a binding declaration of will. Over the years this model has frequently been questioned, especially by theoreticians of the so called «relational contract», a more flexible and change-oriented model that is common in Far-Eastern legal systems such as the Japanese one. This paper maintains that the real differences between the Western neo-classical model and the Japanese relational model lie in the greater attention which the latter pays to the stability of long-term commercial relationships, by providing for duties which prevent the unreasonable interruption in repeated deals or the refusal of the renewal in long-term contracts. Despite the undeniable differences between these two models, over the decades some European legal systems - through legislation or judicial decisions - have shown an ever increasing interest in protecting long-term relationships by acknowledging similar duties, although their scope is usually still confined to competition law. Nevertheless, one should ask whether these duties can play a more relevant role in the near future in the law of contract and contribute to changing the traditional notion of contract in Western legal systems.
Tipologia CRIS:
Articolo su Rivista
Keywords:
Abuse of economic dependence; Discrete contract; Long-term agreement; Relational contract; Repeated deals;
Elenco autori:
Fondrieschi, Alba F.
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